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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Both of thes-e circuit courts of appeal have required a much higher degree
of hostile and abusive behavior than was discussed by the Supreme Court in
Meritor. That the perpetrators in these cases were coworkers is significant
because similar behavior to that alleged in Rabidue and Scott has been found
to sustain a claim for relief under Title VII when a supervisor rather than a
coworker was the perpetrator. 10 9 The emphasis these courts have placed on
the term "hostile" and the requirement that actual psychological effect be
shown indicates, however, that prevailing in a claim for hostile work environ-
ment may be more difficult than first expected. These cases also show that
many judges ,till believe that women are just being overly sensitive. These
decisions should not discourage women who are subjected to unwelcome sex-
ual advances sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of their
employment. This is the test announced by the Meritor Court, and it is the
test that should be applied by the courts.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has long been concerned with the psychological effect
of discriminatory practices on members of a protected class. Its recognition
that Title VII was intended to protect women from this form of abuse is
significant for several reasons. First, women will no longer be required to
quit their job.s in order to escape harassment. This will have the effect of
removing them from a role of stereotypical helplessness. Second, because the
Supreme Court has declared they have a right to work in an environment free
from such abuse, women now have the ammunition needed to prosecute of-
fenders. Third, the problem has acquired needed societal recognition through
the media coverage the decision received.
As much as the decision may have been a boost to freeing women from
sexually hostile work environments, it does not relieve them of the need to
make men aware that advances are unwelcome. The most direct way for
women to accomplish this is with a firm "No!" If this fails to thwart the
harasser, however, a woman can take her fight to the courts, and the Meritor
decision has made that fight easier.
Sharon Malchar Easley
Evidence: The Exclusionary Rule in Civil
Administrative Hearings: Turner v. City of Lawton
In Turner v. City of Lawton, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that arti-
cle 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma constitution grants an individual absolute
109. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Brown v. City of
Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
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security against unlawful search or seizure regardless of whether the pro-
ceeding is civil or criminal in nature.' Turner represents the first time the
court has addressed the applicability of the exclusionary rule to a civil pro-
ceeding in Oklahoma.2 The court's holding signifies a blanket exclusion of all
illegally obtained evidence in all civil proceedings in Oklahoma no matter
what the circumstances.
This note examines the long-range implications of the Turner holding as
well as the legal underpinnings of the decision. This note also reviews the
formulation and modification of the exclusionary rule by the United States
Supreme Court and the adoption and extension of the rule by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.
The central thesis of the note is that the rule should not be considered a
constitutional right in Oklahoma, and even if it is, that it should not be ex-
tended to civil administrative proceedings. The fatal policy weaknesses in
Turner demonstrate the need for a different approach to the problems
associated with the extension of the exclusionary rule to civil administrative
hearings. Finally, the note suggests a better approach to the problem involv-
ing a balancing of the potential deterrent effect of applying the rule in a
given situation with the countervailing public interest in having the evidence
admitted.
Turner v. City of Lawton
Leonard Carl Turner was employed by the city of Lawton as a fireman.
On September 16, 1982, Turner was charged with possession of cocaine with
an intent to distribute. This charge was based on cocaine found in Turner's
house under a search warrant that was later determined to be defective
because of an inadequate affidavit. Turner was dismissed from his duties
when the City Manager learned of Turner's alleged criminal act. While the
criminal charges were pending, Turner appealed his dismissal to the city's
Personnel Board and was given a full hearing. The city presented evidence of
the cocaine taken from Turner's house under the search warrant. The Board
then affirmed the termination of his employment.
Subsequently, in the criminal case, the trial court held the affidavit was in-
sufficient. The search warrant was set aside, the evidence suppressed, and the
criminal charges dismissed. Turner then sought an order from the district
court requiring that the city reinstate him, contending that his dismissal was
based on evidence obtained by an illegal search that violated his constitu-
tional rights. The district court agreed, finding his dismissal improper.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the deterrent effect upon police
officers contemplated by the exclusionary rule is outweighed by the benefit to
1. 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. June 23, 1987) (No.
86-1769).
2. Hess v. State, 84 Okla. 73, 202 P. 310 (1921) (Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the
rule and applied it in a criminal situation).
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society in maintaining the integrity and fitness of firefighters.3 The court con-
cluded that the primary analysis was whether the use of the illegally seized
evidence in the subsequent proceedings provided an incentive for the illegal
search.4 The court indicated that this could be determined by focusing on
whether the official responsibilities and personal interests of the seizing of-
ficer are at all related to the subsequent proceedings.' The court found per-
sonnel termination proceedings too remote from the primary interests of the
police officers who made the seizure of the drugs in Turner's home. Thus,
the introduction of the evidence in the termination hearing was deemed not
to be a motivating factor. 6 The court found no evidence of collusion between
the police who seized the drugs and the city officials who terminated Turner's
employment .7 The court, therefore, concluded that the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule would not have been served by suppressing the evidence
seized in personnel proceedings."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of ap-
peals.9 In reaching its decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court made a radical
departure from the exclusionary rule principles developed by the United
States Supreme Court.'0 The most significant departure is that the exclusion
of evidence acquired by an unconstitutional search and seizure was held to be
a fundamenta- right under the Oklahoma constitution, independent of either
the fourth or fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution."
This view sharply contrasts with the view taken by the United States Supreme
Court that the rule is not an absolute right, but rather a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights through its deterrent
effect.'
2
The court found that the rationale of the United States Supreme Court
cases on the issue are factually and conceptually distinguishable.' 3 The ap-
proach was also deemed too restrictive for application under Oklahoma's
fundamentad law since the new version of the exclusionary rule is merely a
federal rule of evidence.'
4
3. 56 OKZA. B.J. 535 (Okla. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 1985) (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d
307 (2d Cir. 1982) (evidence illegally seized by federal narcotics agents in narcotics investigation
is not excluded from subsequent tax investigation), vacated 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986).
4. 56 OKLA. B.J. at 538.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. June 23, 1987) (No.
86-1769).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974). See also Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1982).
11. 733 P.2d at 381.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
13. 733 P.2d at 379.
14. Id. at 380.
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In an attempt to justify its decision, the court pointed out that the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution was only pertinent if state
constitutions afford their citizens lesser rights and protections.'S The court
believed that the Oklahoma constitution's search and seizure provision pro-
vides Oklahoma citizens with greater protection than does the corresponding
provision of the United States Constitution. This greater protection was pro-
vided by "small, but significant differences between the language of the
Fourth Amendment and art. 2, § 30. ' '"1 The court believed that "the
Oklahoma Constitutional prohibition is broader in scope than its federal
counterpart, forbidding any unreasonable search or seizure and requiring
that the place to be searched be described with greater particularity than does
the federal constitution."' 7 Thus, the majority justified its dramatic
divergence from the United States Supreme Court cases based on the fact
that the rule is a fundamental right under Oklahoma law.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Wilson said that relevant evidence
should not be ipso facto excluded from admission in any and all subsequent
proceedings of a civil nature merely because it was improperly obtained. 8 In-
stead, the court should balance the interests of the individual and of the
public; however, in this case she felt the balance favored exclusion.19 Justice
Wilson, unlike the majority, does not believe that the exclusionary rule is a
fundamental constitutional right. Instead, she has adopted the approach of
the United States Supreme Court and treated the rule as a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights through its deterrent
effect.
Chief Justice Simms wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Hodges
and Summers joined. He adopted the approach of the United States Supreme
Court and said that the interests should be balanced and the motivation of
the officers who seized the evidence should be examined to see if their in-
terests are related to the civil proceeding. 0 The dissent concluded that there
was no close relationship between the search by the police and the subsequent
use of the evidence by the city and the Personnel Board and that the evidence
should, therefore, not be excluded." Thus, the dissent also believed that the
exclusionary rule was not a fundamental constitutional right but rather a
supervisory device as pronounced by the United States Supreme Court.
Implications of the Decision
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's dogmatic view of the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to civil proceedings has some negative long-term implica-
15. Id.
16. Id. (These differences are really illusory. See discussion infra accompanying notes 26-29).
17. Id. (emphasis supplied by court). See discussion infra accompanying notes 26-29 for
comparison of the two provisions.
18. Id. at 383 (Wilson, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 383 (Simms, C.J., dissenting).
21. Id.
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tions. The most important of these arises from the court's holding that il-
legally obtained evidence is ipso facto excluded from admission in any and all
subsequent proceedings. 22 This means that no matter what the circumstances,
improperly obtained evidence will not be admitted in any kind of proceeding
regardless of how slight the infraction on the individual's rights or how great
the public interest in having the evidence admitted. One writer has stated:
[W]hen exclusion of relevant evidence is unlikely to have an ap-
preciable deterrent effect, or when there are strong countervailing
reasons for admitting such evidence because of the importance of
the private interests at stake, integrity of the legal system may de-
mand more than an easy answer [i.e., blanket exclusion]. Since
the harm done to private law by a blanket constitutional exclusion
may be a greater evil than the admission of unconstitutionally
seized evidence, the better approach will, initially at least, permit
needed privacy safeguards to be established within the confines of
the policies of the private law system.23
Many examples come to mind where the public interest is so great that
society demands that illegally obtained evidence be admissible in certain non-
criminal hearings even if the rule is a constitutional right in criminal pro-
ceedings. For example, evidence of a sixth-grade teacher's act of oral copula-
tion in a doorless toilet stall in a public restroom at a downtown department
store should be admissible at his dismissal proceeding. 24 Also, it seems just as
sensible that evidence of drug use by someone such as an air traffic con-
troller, who has the safety of many persons in his hands every day, should be
admissible in a termination proceeding. The public interest in having the
evidence admitted in these situations is so strong that it easily outweighs any
potential harm caused by the admission of the evidence. Yet, under the ap-
proach adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the evidence would not be
admissible in either of these situations or any others that can as easily come
to mind where the public interest overwhelmingly demands admission. Even
if the exclusionary rule is constitutionally based, that does not necessarily mean
that it should be blindly extended to noncriminal hearings where the public
interest overwhelmingly demands admittance.
Evolution of the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy to help safeguard the
fourth amendment through its deterrent effect. 2' The fourth amendment pro-
vides:
22. Id. at 381.
23. Note, Constitutional Exclusion of Evidence in Civil Litigation, 55 VA. L. REV. 1484,
1492 (1969).
24. Governing Bd. of Mountain View School Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1974) (admissibility upheld).
25. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
2 6
The Oklahoma provision in article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma constitu-
tion is virtually identical to the fourth amendment and was closely patterned
after it. The Oklahoma section states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches or seizures shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, describing as particularly
as may be the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.2
7
The only real differences in the two provisions are emphasized. If
anything, the Oklahoma provision appears to be more permissive than the
fourth amendment since it modifies the particularity with which a warrant
must describe the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized by
introducing a factor of reasonableness with the phrase "as particularly as
may be. '" 2 8 Since a state constitutional provision cannot give less protection
than a similar federal amendment, the provisions should be read as if iden-
tical. The court in Turner, however, held that the above difference made the
Oklahoma provision more restrictive29
Although these provisions have been in place since the adoption of the
respective constitutions, the exclusionary rule did not arise until 1914.30 At
common law, the rule was that evidence obtained illegally was admissible in
all actions whether criminal or civil. 3 ' The policy behind the rule allowing ad-
mission was that the ultimate result of getting the truth justified the means of
26. U.S. CONS-r. amend. IV (emphasis added).
27. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 30 (emphasis added).
28. There is also a difference in the two provisions in that the fourth amendment protects
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" while the Oklahoma provision protects against
"unreasonable searches or seizures." However, for purposes of the exclusionary rule this dif-
ference cannot be considered significant because there must be an improper seizure before the
admissibility of the seized evidence and the exclusionary rule can become an issue. Also, the
United States Supreme Court has read the "and" such that it is an "or" in cases involving the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
29. 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 23, 1987) (No. 86-
1769).
30. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976) (indicates the common law
rule). See also Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545, 547 (1923) (stating the rule as com-
mon law rule in Oklahoma).
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illegally seizing the evidence. The court would not look into the collateral
issue of whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the law.3
In the landmark case of Weeks v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment is not admissible in federal criminal trials. 3 The Court, in discarding
the common law rule, reasoned that if illegally seized evidence could be used
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the fourth amend-
ment declaring his right to be secure from such searches and seizures would
be of no value .3 Thus, the exclusionary rule was born.
3
Since that time the rule has gone through an evolutionary process. Shortly
after Weeks, as dicta in another case involving the admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence in a criminal trial, the Court said that improperly obtained
evidence "shall not be used at all. '" 36 Next, the Court extended the rule to
forfeiture proceedings.3 7 In doing so, the Court reasoned that forfeiture pro-
ceedings were quasi-criminal because their purpose was to penalize the com-
mission of an offense against the law. 3' Hence, the Court expanded the scope
of the exclusionary rule.
Then, in United States v. Calandra, the Supreme Court made a major
change in its approach toward the exclusionary rule by devising a balancing
test to determine whether to extend the rule to a particular noncriminal pro-
ceeding. 39 Thus, a test was devised that would determine whether the exclu-
sionary rule should be applied to such proceedings as grand jury hearings, as
was the case in Calandra, and civil termination hearings, as was the case in
Turner. The Court held that the interest of the public in having the evidence
heard must be balanced with the potential deterrent benefits of applying the
rule to determine whether the rule should be applied in a given situation.
40
The Court declared the exclusionary rule to be a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights through its deterrent effect
rather than a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party.4 ' This
meant that the application of the rule should be restricted to only those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most effectively served. 42 Hence, in
32. Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545, 547 (1923).
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (police officers searched defendant's room without a warrant and
took possession of certain incriminating papers that prosecution later introduced at trial over
defendant's objeztions).
34. Id. at 393.
35. The exclsionary rule was then extended to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (This is the language
the Turner court seized upon in reaching its decision.).
37. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
38. Id. at 700.
39. 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (Court applied balancing test to determine the exclusionary
rule would not apply to grand jury hearings).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 348.
42. Id.
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Calandra the Supreme Court declared that the exclusionary rule is not a con-
stitutional right but a supervisory device. This result contrasts sharply with
the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in Turner."3
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court stated in Calandra that the
rule does not apply in all situations against all persons." This makes it clear
that the rule would not be applied in all situations as the dicta in some earlier
cases seemed to imply. Also, the Court stated that the prime purpose of the
rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct and not to redress a wrong
against the injured party. 5 Thus, the Court identified deterrence as the key
policy factor underlying the fourth amendment upon which it would focus in
applying the exclusionary rule.
Then, in United States v. Janis, the Court was given a chance to examine
the exclusionary rule in the context of a civil proceeding. In this case the
Court held, after applying the balancing test, that the rule should not be ex-
tended where the evidence is sought to be used in a civil proceeding of a
sovereign different from the one whose agent illegally seized the evidence.' 6
In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that the duty and concern of
police officers is the criminal enforcement process and when evidence is
excluded from this process it is not necessary to impose any other sanctions
against the officer to achieve the desired deterrent effect.1
7
The Court also stated in Janis that it had never applied the rule to exclude
evidence from a state or federal civil proceeding 8 and that it would take
special circumstances for the rule to be so applied. Finally, Janis mandates
that exclusion be shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring unlawful
police conduct so that it outweighs the social costs imposed by exclusion
before the rule is extended to a particular situation. 9
In United States v. Leon,"0 the Supreme Court modified the exclusionary
rule even more dramatically. Leon held that if the exclusionary rule did not
result in appreciable deterrence in a particular situation then its use in that
situation was unwarranted-even if the proceeding was criminal. 51 Following
this principle, the Court created a broad good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. The Court then held that evidence was admissible in a criminal
trial where it was obtained by police officers acting in good faith on a war-
rant that later turned out to be defective.1
2
43. See discussion supra accompanying notes I and 9-12.
44. 414 U.S. at 348.
45. Id. at 347.
46. 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (state police officer illegally seized evidence that was subsequently
denied admission in a state criminal proceeding, but the evidence was then used by the IRS to
assess additional taxes on the defendant).
47. Id. at 448.
48. Id. at 447.
49. Id. at 454.
50. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
51. Id. at 916.
52. Id. at 922.
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In reaching its decision in Leon, the Court held that the use of the fruits of
a past unlawful search worked no new fourth amendment wrong and that the
fourth amendment had never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction
of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings against all persons." The ques-
tion of whether the exclusionary rule is to be applied is a separate issue from
whether the fourth amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the ex-
clusion were violated." Thus, the Court applied the balancing test it had
devised in United States v. Calandra5 and created a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.6 This is the current state of the exclusionary rule under
the Supreme Court decisions.
The Exclusionary Rule in Oklahoma
Under the Oklahoma decisions, the exclusionary rule underwent a similar
evolutionary process closely following the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions. Then, abruptly in Turner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided to
diverge dramatically from the course set by the Supreme Court.
Oklahoma adopted the exclusionary rule in Hess v. State.7 Hess involved
an action to recover illegally seized property that the state was holding as
evidence for a criminal proceeding. Prior to Hess, the common law rule was
that all evidence was admissible no matter how it was obtained." The Hess
court, in abandoning the common law rule, relied on the United States
Supreme Court cases adopting the exclusionary rule and cases in other
jurisdictions following the Supreme Court decisions. 9 Thus, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule based on the United States
Supreme Court and other jurisdictions' interpretations of the fourth amend-
ment. The ,Oklahoma court did not adopt the rule as a totally separate matter
arising from article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma constitution. The implicit
reasoning was that the Oklahoma provision and the fourth amendment were
virtually identical and, therefore, Oklahoma should follow the lead of the
United States Supreme Court.'0
Next, in Gore v. State the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
adopted the exclusionary rule for criminal proceedings. 6' In adopting the rule
this court stated:
53. Id. at 900, 904.
54. Id. at 904.
55. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
56. 468 U.S. 897, 913-22 (1984).
57. 84 Okla. 73, 202 P. 310 (1921) (action to recover illegally seized property that state was
holding as evidence).
58. See, e.g., Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545, 547 (1923).
59. 84 Okla. 73, 202 P. at 313-15 (citing Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 101, 96 N.W.
730 (1903); Youman v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 189 Ky. 291, 224 S.W. 860 (1920); People
v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919)).
60. The court in Turner held just the opposite. See discussion supra accompanying note 29.
61. 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545 (1923).
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Therefore if it appears that the highest court of the land has
definitely fixed a rule applying to the introduction of evidence ob-
tained by illegal seizure, it follows without argument that the rule
of evidence in the state courts, where like facts and principles of
law are involved, should conform to that settled by the court hav-
ing supreme prestige and authority. This is further emphasized by
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ... in Hess v.
State following the construction given by the federal Supreme
Court.
6 1
Then, like the United States Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court applied the exclusionary rule in a forfeiture proceeding. 63 Although in.
this instance the court applied the exclusionary rule to a forfeiture proceeding
before the Supreme Court had ruled on the issue, in doing so it relied on the
decisions of several federal circuit courts of appeal.64 In developing the exclu-
sionary rule, the Oklahoma courts continued to follow the lead of other
courts' decisions under the fourth amendment.
Later, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma declared that the ex-
clusionary rule is a part of a constitutional right and not merely a rule of
evidence adopted in the exercise of supervisory power.6" Once again, the
court looked to a federal circuit court decision for authority for this proposi-
tion.6 6 Also, the court, in reaching its decision, did not even mention the pro-
vision in article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma constitution. Instead, the
court relied solely on the fourth amendment.
6 7
Therefore, Oklahoma courts, in adopting and modifying the exclusionary
rule, have closely followed federal precedent in their interpretations of the
fourth amendment without relying on article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma
constitution. Focusing exclusively on the fourth amendment, the Oklahoma
courts have treated it as identical to the corresponding provision in the
Oklahoma constitution. However, in the case of Turner v. City of Lawton,
this pattern came to an abrupt and illogical end.68 The Oklahoma courts had
not dealt with the extension of the rule to a purely civil hearing until Turner.
62. Id. at 547-48.
63. One 1949 Pickup Truck v. State, 206 Okla. 36, 240 P.2d 1107 (1952) (state sought
forfeiture of defendant's truck after discovering illegal whiskey in an improper search).
64. Id. at 1109 (citing Kelly v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932)); Alvau v. United
States, 33 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1929)).
65. Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399, 1403 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (Involved extension of
exclusionary rule to a hearing to revoke a suspended sentence. Court denied admission on the
basis that a suspended sentence could only be revoked based on competent evidence, and
evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure is not competent evidence.).
66. Id. (citing Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1968)). Verdugo has
since been overruled on this point by United States v. Calandra. See discussion supra accompa-
nying notes 39-45.
67. Michaud, 505 P.2d at 1403.
68. 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. June 23, 1987) (No.
86-1769).
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Constitutional Right or Judicially Created Remedy?
The premise upon which Turner is based is the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
determination that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right under the
Oklahoma constitution. As such, it applies to civil as well as criminal pro-
ceedings. The first problem with this premise is that the Oklahoma provision
does not provide that illegally obtained evidence shall not be used once it is
seized. The provision merely states that the right of the people to be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and that "no
warrant shedl issue but upon probable cause." 69 Nowhere is the exclusion of
evidence in subsequent proceedings mentioned or mandated.10
The United States Supreme Court decided the exclusionary rule was not a
constitutional right on this basis. The Supreme Court has held that the rule is
a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights
and is not a constitutional right.7' The Court has interpreted the rule this way
because it realized that the exclusionary rule "is not a command of the
Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Con-
gress might negate. '" 2 Also, the Court has commented that "the Fourth
Amendment does not itself contain any provision expressly precluding the
use of such [illegally obtained] evidence, and ... [it is] extremely doubtful
that such a provision could properly be inferred from nothing more than the
basic command against unreasonable searches and seizures."
7 3
This same reasoning applies to the Oklahoma provision as well because it
is so similar to the fourth amendment. However, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court refused to recognize this reasoning and did not address it in its deci-
sion. The state supreme court by its decision has, in effect, legislated that the
exclusionary rule is a constitutional right. There is nothing in article 2, sec-
tion 30 of the Oklahoma constitution that even remotely supports the pro-
position that illegally obtained evidence may not be admitted in any action,
whether criminal or civil.
A second problem with the Oklahoma Supreme Court's premise that the
exclusionary rule is a constitutional right is that it is based upon authority
that is now out of date. The court cited an Oklahoma Court of Appeals case
in support of the proposition.74 However, in reaching its decision, the court
of appeals held the exclusionary rule to be a constitutional right based upon
two now outdated United States Supreme Court cases- Weeks v. United
States and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.7-
69. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 30.
70. The exclusionary rule was not adopted in Oklahoma until 1921. See discussion supra ac-
companying notes 57-60.
71. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
446 (1976); UniteJ States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
72. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 661-62.
74. 733 P.2d 375, 378 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3853 (U.S. June 23, 1987)
(No. 86-1769).
75. Id. (citing Simmons v. State, 277 P.2d 196, 198 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954)).
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An additional problem with the Turner court's holding is the sudden
shift in approach by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. After basing adoption of
the rule and all extensions and modifications thereof on United States
Supreme Court doctrine and other decisions interpreting the fourth amend-
ment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has suddenly diverged from the weight
of authority interpreting the fourth amendment. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court has now decided that the exclusionary rule arises independent of the
fourth amendment as a matter of right from seemingly just discovered "dif-
ferent" provisions of article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma constitution. Yet,
all of the court's cited authority is based on the United States Supreme
Court's decisions under the fourth amendment.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court justified its divergence from the approach
taken by the United States Supreme Court to a large extent on what the court
perceived to be "small, but significant" differences in the fourth amendment
and the corresponding Oklahoma provision.76 Close inspection of the two
provisions, however, reveals that any difference in the two provisions is il-
lusory. If anything, the Oklahoma provision would seem to be more per-
missive than its federal counterpart because it requires the place to be
described "as particularly as may be," ' 77 while the federal provision requires
the place to be searched to be particularly described. 7 1 Therefore, this basis
for the court's holding that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right can-
not be supported.
By calling the rule a constitutional right, the Oklahoma court has allowed
itself to avoid approaching the problem of admissibility of evidence through
a balancing test. As discussed above, this pronouncement by the state court is
supported by neither the express wording of the state constitution nor in-
dependent authority. It is, in essence, an example of an overstepping of
judicial authority.
Extension of the Exclusionary Rule
Another problem with the court's decision in Turner is that even if the ex-
clusionary rule were a constitutional right in Oklahoma for criminal and
76. Id. at 380.
77. Article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma constitution states:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, describing
as particularly as may be the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
(Emphasis added).
78. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of persons to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
(Emphasis added.)
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quasi-criminal proceedings, it does not necessarily follow that it is or should
be for civil proceedings. There are many examples where the Constitution
and the law give criminal defendants greater protection than civil
defendants. 79 This is primarily because criminal defendants invariably face
imprisonment while civil defendants only face pecuniary loss. This difference
in potentia penalties makes it necessary for the law to give the criminal
defendant much greater protection than the civil defendant. Therefore, even
if the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right of criminal defendants, it
does not necessarily follow that it is a right of civil defendants.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also appears to have ignored some signifi-
cant policy considerations in extending the exclusionary rule to civil ad-
ministrative hearings. The primary oversight is the policy behind the fourth
amendment and the comparable Oklahoma provision. The purpose of these
provisions is to protect persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The drafters of the Bill of Rights considered this protection necessary in light
of the infamous Writ of Assistance, which allowed British officials to enter
colonial homes and buildings and conduct searches under various pretenses.8 0
Thus, the fourth amendment was drafted to abolish the abuses colonists suf-
fered under the Writ of Assistance. The amendment accomplished this goal
by requiring probable caus& before a search warrant could be issued.81
Later, the Supreme Court developed the exclusionary rule to effectuate the
policy underlying the fourth amendment: deterrence of unreasonable search-
es and seizures.82 The rule was extended to situations where the Court felt
it would be effective in deterring future illegal searches and seizures.83
Therefore, deterrence is the primary consideration in applying the rule
whether the rule is a constitutional right or a supervisory device. Hence, if
the policy underlying the fourth amendment is to be served, the exclusionary
rule should only be applied in situations where it will deter future
unreasonable searches and seizures.
In a civil case, like Turner, it is difficult to see how extension of the rule
can deter future unlawful conduct. Police officers are a part of the criminal
justice system. As such, their duty is to enforce the criminal laws and arrest
and charge people with crimes. What goes on in the civil arena and with the
civil law is totally outside of the scope of a police officer's interest. The
deterrent effect in criminal situations is generally substantial.' However, in
the civil arena, police officers are not interested in whether evidence is ad-
79. For example, the burden of proof differs, as does the number of concurring jurors it re-
quires to obtain a verdict.
80. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1
(1978).
81. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
82. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
83. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
84. See, however, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Supreme Court held deterrent
purpose not met in criminal action where police relied on warrant in good faith that later turned
out to be defective).
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missible. If evidence is excluded from a civil trial, police officers are unlikely
to know about it, much less understand why the evidence was excluded.
Therefore, it is unlikely that applying the exclusionary rule to civil pro-
ceedings would have any appreciable impact on future police activities. As a
result, the underlying deterrent purpose of the fourth amendment would not
be served.
There are, however, cases where there can be a deterrent effect from apply-
ing the rule in a civil proceeding. These cases arise when the primary motiva-
tion of the search is not criminal prosecution but some outside purpose, such
as getting an employee dismissed from his job. In these cases deterrence is
possible, and the rule should be applied where the potential deterrent value
of applying the rule outweighs the public interest in having the evidence ad-
mitted.
Turner, however, is not this type of case. In Turner the search was
motivated entirely by a desire for criminal prosecution. The dismissal oc-
curred only after the City Manager learned of the charges against Turner.
The opinion was totally devoid of any evidence that the police were
motivated by anything other than a desire to collect evidence for the criminal
prosecution of Turner. Therefore, the deterrent value of applying the exclu-
sionary rule in Turner was minimal.
Another policy consideration the court ignored in extending the exclu-
sionary rule to the proceeding in Turner is that an administrative termination
hearing differs significantly from a criminal or civil trial. Constitutional pro-
tections are not as great in an administrative termination hearing. For exam-
ple, the evidentiary and procedural rules are less stringent in administrative
hearings than in other actions." Thus, evidence that is inadmissible in other
actions may be admissible in an administrative hearing.
Additionally, the purpose of a hearing such as the one in Turner is to
determine whether the city had, at most, "good cause" for firing the
employee. The emphasis is not on proving that the employee actually did the
thing for which he was fired but whether his employer acted properly in fir-
ing him. An employee who has been fired is only entitled to minimal due pro-
cess protections86 and a "rational explanation" for his termination .8  The
scope of review of such a termination is the court's determination of whether
the decision of the agency was so irrational as to render the decision arbitrary
and capricious."' The review does not extend to a review of the factual basis
for the determination. 9 These differences indicate substantial dissimilarity
85. Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Adjudicatory Pro-
ceedings, 66 IOWA L. REv. 343, 359 (1981).
86. Umholtz v. City of Tulsa, 565 P.2d 15, 24 (Okla. 1977) (court held city employee had
property right in his job that was limited and defined by the procedural language of the city or-
dinances and that employee was not entitled to full protection of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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between civil administrative hearings and the types of proceedings in which
the exclusionary rule has been traditionally imposed. Imposing the exclu-
sionary rule in a civil administrative hearing will only decrease the effec-
tiveness of the hearing and will require that the tribunal make rulings on
issues outside of its expertise.
Another policy factor the court did not consider in extending the exclu-
sionary rule stems from the fact that the evidence was not declared to be in-
admissible in the criminal action until after the post-termination hearing.
Hence, the hearing board reached its decision on what was then thought to
be competent evidence. If a termination board must wait until after the
criminal action against an individual is complete to make sure none of the
evidence it is presented was illegally obtained, there could be a delay of
several years in the post-termination hearing. This would render the hearing
virtually worthless. The employee will be suspended pending the outcome of
the hearing and the city will have to wait an inordinate amount of time to
hire a replacement. Then, if the city loses, it may even have to pay a large
amount of accrued wages and benefits. Such a result does not make sense
economically or otherwise.
Also, it has been said that if the primary purpose of an administrative pro-
ceeding is to enforce an independent regulatory program, a balancing test
should be used to determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule even
though the program may have penal attributes.90 The rationale is that if a
blanket exclusion is applied without any balancing of respective interests, the
whole purpose of the regulatory program will be defeated. The rigid applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to the city's termination hearing in Turner has
totally defeated the city's ability to administer its independent employee
regulatory program.
The Better Approach
Clearly, there is a better approach than the absolute rule stated and applied
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. An equitable rule that balances all of the
critical interests can easily be extracted from the recent federal Supreme
Court cases9 and Tirado v. Commissioner.92 This is essentially the balancing
approach adopted by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals93 and the dissent in
Turner v. City of Lawton ." This balancing approach can be applied even if
the exclusionary rule is considered a constitutional right in Oklahoma. It
allows a court to focus on the critical policy factor of deterrence, which is the
underlying basis for the fourth amendment and the creation of the exclu-
sionary rule.
90. Note, supra note 85, at 359.
91. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
92. Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1982).
93. 56 OKLA. B.J. (Okla. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 1985), vacated 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986).
94. 733 P.2d 375, 383 (Okla. 1986) (Simms, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3853 (U.S. June 23, 1987) (No. 86-1769).
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The approach consists of balancing the public interest in having the
evidence heard with the possible deterrent effect of excluding the evidence. 9"
To determine the deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule, the
motives of the seizing official must be explored. 96 The analysis should focus
on whether the official responsibilities and personal interests of the seizing
officer are at all related to the subsequent proceedings. Then it can be deter-
mined whether the use of the illegally seized evidence in a civil proceeding
provided an incentive for the illegal search. 7 In addition, the court should
look for any evidence of bad faith or collusion on the part of the seizing of-
ficial.9 8
This approach recognizes that there are competing interests and weighs
them accordingly. It also recognizes that there is nothing in either the fourth
amendment or article 2, section 30 specifically prohibiting the use of illegally
obtained evidence in a subsequent proceeding. The approach recognizes that
deterrence is the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule and the primary
policy underlying the fourth amendment. When the possible deterrent value
of applying the rule to a particular situation is not strong enough, the interest
of the public in having the evidence heard may be important enough to allow
inclusion. This approach avoids ipso facto rules and, therefore, is more
equitable in considering all of the circumstances of a particular situation.
If the court in Turner had adopted this balancing test, the outcome of the
case would probably have been very different. The deterrent value, if any, of
applying the exclusionary rule in this case is marginal. There was no close
relationship between the illegal search and the subsequent use of the evidence
in the personnel board hearing. The purposes of the original search and the
termination hearing were totally different.
The motivation for the original search was to gather evidence against
Turner for criminal prosecution. The purpose of the hearing was to deter-
mine whether the City Manager acted properly in terminating Turner upon
learning of the drugs being found in his house. The drugs were only intro-
duced in the termination hearing to show that the City Manager did, in fact,
have legitimate grounds for terminating Turner's employment. The police
have no motivating interest in assisting the city in determining hiring and fir-
ing of employees. They are interested only in providing evidence for the con-
viction of criminals.
The California Court of Appeals recognized this when it stated: "The
police in making investigations of suspected criminal activity are ... gen-
erally completely unaware of any consequences of success in their in-
vestigative efforts other than the subsequent criminal prosecution of the
suspected offender." 99
95. See, e.g., Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
96. See, e.g., Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1982). See also United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (evidence is admissible in criminal action where police officer
seizes evidence in good faith reliance on a warrant that later turns out to be defective).
97. See Tirado, 689 F.2d at 311, 312.
98. Id. at 312. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
99. Governing Bd. of Mountain View School Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal.
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Additionally, there was no evidence of collusion between the police and the
city official; who fired Turner. If anything, the evidence indicates that there
was a minor defect in the search warrant in the form of an insufficient af-
fidavit that did not appear until after the criminal action subsequent to the
termination hearing.'00 At the time of the termination hearing, the warrant
appeared to be valid and the city officials on the Personnel Board certainly
could not be expected to rule on the adequacy of the search warrant, an
endeavor clearly outside of the scope of their expertise. Therefore, it is read-
ily apparent that any deterrent value gained from applying the exclusionary
rule in this situation is negligible."'0
Also, the police were adequately deterred by the later exclusion of the
evidence in the criminal action. As discussed before, the criminal action is the
primary, if not exclusive, concern of the police. Once the evidence is exclud-
ed from the criminal action, the deterrent value of excluding the evidence
from a civil termination hearing is almost nonexistent.
The Oklahoma statutes and tort law in general provide an additional source of
deterrence where evidence is illegally obtained. The statutes make it a misde-
meanor to maliciously and without probable cause procure a search warrant
to be issued and executed. 02 Additionally, someone who has suffered an il-
legal search or seizure may have a tort action against those responsible. The
United States Supreme Court has held that the victim of an illegal search and
seizure has a federal cause of action under the fourth amendment for
damages incurred as a result of the violation of the amendment.'0 3 These
remedies serve not only to deter but also give the person whose rights have
been violated a possible route for seeking vindication.
Given the slight deterrent value to be gained from extending the exclu-
sionary rule to this situation, the evidence should be admitted if there is any
substantial public interest in having the evidence heard. The interest of the
public in having the evidence heard in Turner is substantial. First, there is the
general interest of society in having the truth revealed in all judicial hearings.
Society wants decisions in all proceedings to be based upon all of the facts.
Second, there is strong citizen interest in municipal firefighters not becoming
involved in criminality and/or drugs. The public relies heavily on the fire
department to protect its health and safety. A fireman has the responsibility
of protecting the lives and property of the community on a daily basis.
Rptr. 724, 726 (1974). See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448 (1976) (duty and con-
cern of police officers is the criminal enforcement process and when evidence is excluded from
this process it is not necessary to impose any other sanctions against the officer).
100. Turner is very similar to Leon in that the evidence was seized in good faith reliance on a
warrant that later was declared invalid because of an inadequate affidavit. However, in Leon the
United States Supreme Court held the illegally seized evidence to be admissible in the criminal
action. The Turner court refused to even consider Leon.
101. The court of appeals and the dissent reached this same conclusion. 56 OKLA. B.J. 535
(Okla. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 1985); 733 P.2d 375, 383 (Okla. 1986) (Simms, C.J., dissenting).
102. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1239 (1981).
103. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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Thus, it appears that the public interest in having the evidence heard
clearly outweighs any possible deterrent effect of excluding the evidence. Ad-
mission of the evidence certainly would not have the effect of making all city
employees the targets of illegal searches and seizures, as suggested by the ma-
jority in Turner."4 Even if the police were interested in persecuting city
workers, as the court has suggested, any evidence obtained under this course
of action would not be admissible under the balancing test because the police
would no longer be acting in good faith, and deterrence would again be a factor.
Conclusion
The pronouncement of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Turner v. City of
Lawton that illegally obtained evidence is ipso facto inadmissible in any
subsequent proceeding is misguided and shortsighted. The court has decided
that the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right in Oklahoma. This pro-
nouncement is not supported by the Oklahoma search and seizure provision,
the policy underlying the prohibition of illegal searches and seizures, or the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in point. Although the recent
Supreme Court cases on the exclusionary rule are not binding on the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, they should be very persuasive. This is especially
true considering that the fourth amendment and article 2, section 30 of the
Oklahoma constitution are virtually identical and that Oklahoma adopted the
exclusionary rule initially and developed it following United States Supreme
Court precedent. The court's pronouncement in Turner that the exclusionary
rule is a constitutional right in Oklahoma thus appears to be based on faulty
reasoning.
Even if the exclusionary rule were a constitutional right in Oklahoma, that
does not necessarily mean that it should have been extended to a civil ad-
ministrative hearing. The primary policy underlying both the fourth amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule itself is deterrence. If the goal cannot be fur-
thered by extending the rule to a particular proceeding, then a court should
take cognizance of the countervailing public interest in having the evidence
heard and allow it to be admitted. If something is a constitutional right for
criminal actions, it does not necessarily follow that it also is for civil actions.
The balancing approach suggested by the United States Supreme Court
and elaborated on in this discussion is preferable to the hard-line approach of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court. By balancing the possible deterrent effects of
extending the rule to a particular situation with the public's interest in having
the evidence heard in that situation, the court can reach a more equitable
result that ensures that the interests of all parties receive proper consideration
and attention. The Oklahoma Supreme Court should reexamine its pro-
nouncements in Turner and carefully consider adopting the balancing ap-
proach that has been suggested.
Scott Meacham
104. 733 P.2d at 379.
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